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The First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in 1975 an-
nounced a sweeping reorganization of economic planning and man-
agement in Cuba, signalling a new direction in Cuba's approach to the
transformation from capitalism to socialism. The program approved
at the Congress introduced the new "System of Economic Manage-
ment and Planning" (SDPE)' and adopted Cuba's first five-year eco-
nomic plan. Central to the new approach was the decentralization of
production management from central state entities to state enter-
prises, 2 and the introduction of a system of contracts 3 to enforce ac-
* Research for this article was supported by a grant from DePaul University College of
Law. The author expresses appreciation to Victor Armendariz for his assistance in legislative
research and to Prof. Jules Lobel for his valuable comments on earlier drafts. Unless otherwise
noted, all translations from Spanish to English are the author's.
** Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1964, Barnard;
J.D. 1976, Rutgers.
1. Sistema de Direcci6n y Planificaci6n de la Economia (System of the Direction and
Planning of the Economy). The SDPE is modelled in large part, at least in form, after the
systems adopted in the Soviet Union and numerous Eastern European Socialist Countries. See
Zimbalist, Cuban Economic Planning: Organization and Performance, in CUBA: TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION 214-17 (S. Halebsky & J. Kirk eds. 1985). Zimbalist suggests
that while the form may have been adopted from the Soviets, the new system is in practice
distinctly Cuban, particularly with respect to broad popular participation in the planning pro-
cess. Id.
2. All production enterprises are owned by the state and regulated by Decreto-Ley
Numero 42 (1979) (Reglamento General de ]a Empresa Estatal) [hereinafter Decreto-Ley is
written as Decree-Law]. Private enterprise in Cuba, on the other hand, is limited to proprie-
tary service units, such as repair services, hair cutting, street vendors, photographers, garden-
ers, plumbers, etc. Such people who "work for themselves" must obtain a license from the
state for which they pay a monthly fee ranging from ten to sixty pesos depending on the type of
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countability among the enterprises. Cuba adopted a system of state
arbitration in 1977 to assure compliance with the national economic
plan and to resolve contract and commercial conflicts between
enterprises.
4
During the first fifteen years of the revolution, Cuba had insti-
tuted a system of central budgetary accounting under which market
mechanisms were rejected, 5 economic planning and management were
centralized and all production units were financed out of a central
budget.6 Management of individual enterprises was not accountable
for balancing costs and revenues or for profitability. 7 Material incen-
tives were eschewed. 8 The system was dedicated to radical egalitari-
anism, relying on moral incentives to promote discipline and
productivity. 9 The failure of the system of central budgetary account-
ing to achieve economic progress was painfully apparent in the early
1970s.10
In 1975, the government apparently recognized the need for the
introduction of material incentives and the decentralization of the
economy to improve efficiency, but did not propose a total shift.
Thus, fundamental features of the SDPE included both the strength-
service performed. Resoluci6n Conjunta No. 15 de los Comites Estatales de Finanzas y de
Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1984. Independent farmers may sell produce in "free markets";
they are charged a tax on gross sales. M. BENJAMIN, J. COLLINS & M. SCOTT, No FREE
LUNCH 77 (1985) [hereinafter cited as No FREE LUNCH].
3. See infra notes 34 & 48 and accompanying text.
4. Decree-Law 10 (1977) granted the Council of Ministers authority to establish a state
arbitration system. Council of State, Decree-Law 10 (1977) (Disposici6n authorizante) re-
printed in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984).
5. Economists have noted that Cuba in the mid-1960's relied less on market mechanisms
than any other socialist country. See, e.g., L. HUBERMAN & P. SWEEZY, SOCIALISM IN CUBA
164 (1969).
6. Id. at 163-68.
7. Id. at 164.
8. Id. at 164-66.
9. Id.
10. See Edelstein, Economic Policy and Development Models, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF REVOLUTION 187-89 (S. Halebsky & J. Kirk eds. 1985); Fuller, Production Quotas
and Profits, 3 CUBATIMES 5-7 (1982). For a general discussion of the changes in economic
policy in Cuba, see Edelstein, supra at 180-92; E. BOORSTEIN, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMA-
TION OF CUBA (1968); see generally L. HUBERMAN & P. SWEEZY, supra note 5; C. MESA-
LAGO, THE ECONOMY OF SOCIALIST CUBA (1981); A. MACEWAN, REVOLUTION AND Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CUBA (1981).
The "errors" in the budgetary accounting system were expressly pointed out in the Main
Report of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba. Specifically cited as problems
were the over-centralization of management and the lack of market mechanisms, norms of
commercial transactions and material incentives. Informe Central, PRIMER CONGRESO DEL
PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA 102-05 (1976) [hereinafter cited at Informe Central I].
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ening of centralized planning and the decentralization of production
management through semi-autonomous state enterprises which were
to be self-managing, self-financing, and profit maximizing. Reliance
on moral incentives to stimulate workers was augmented by a system
of material incentives and bonuses11 in order to increase productiv-
ity.12 Although the adoption of material incentives indicated an ac-
ceptance of some degree of economic inequality, 13 introduction of the
new economic system was accompanied by an expansion of popular
participation in decision-making which favored political equality.14
The system also envisioned participation in economic planning at
all levels of the economy including the ultimate consumer,15 worker
11. The new economic policy introduced material incentives for both workers and man-
agement. Bonuses are paid either to individual workers or to entire collectives in addition to
salary for surpassing of determined guidelines. Funds for bonuses come from the earnings of
the enterprise. In the case of unprofitable enterprises which produce necessary social goods,
the state provides a subsidy from which bonuses can be paid. See EL SISTEMA DE DIREccI6N
Y PLANIFICATI6N DE LA ECONOMIA EN LAS EMPRESAS 159-68 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
SISTEMA EcON6MICA]. The bonus system creates incentive for efficient production, with a
minimum of waste. In addition, housing allocations and distribution of large appliances such
as washing machines and refrigerators are distributed by work centers to workers based on
productivity and need. See Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 219-20. Although expensive, these
items are not beyond the reach of production workers and can also be purchased in stores.
12. Worker disciplinary procedures were also strengthened. See 2nd Congress of the
Communist Party of Cuba, Documents and Speeches 34-35 (1981) (hereinafter cited as 2D
CONG. PCC]. Worker absenteeism had been a major problem compounding the inefficiency of
production under the old system. A major change in labor law occurred in 1980, giving the
enterprise administration the authority to impose disciplinary measures. Council of State, De-
cree-Law 32, art. 1 (1980) (Sobre la Disciplina Laboral de los Trabajadores). Previously, disci-
plinary decisions were made by worker councils. For a discussion of the reasons for the
change as well as the resulting impact, see Perez-Stable, Class, Organization, and Conciencia:
The Cuban Working Class after 1970, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION 139-
212 (S. Halebsky & J. Kirk eds. 1985).
13. One study of income distribution in Cuba suggests that even with the initiation of
incentives, Cuba continues to narrow the gap between the highest and lowest paid workers and
has achieved a redistribution of wealth unequaled in the hemisphere. Brundenius, Growth
With Equity, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION 193-212 (S. Halebsky & J.
Kirk eds. 1985).
14. The first Congress approved for ratification by popular referendum a draft of the new
National Constitution. Informe Central I, supra note 10, at 153-58. The Constitution, which
was ratified in 1976 after discussion in mass organizations nationwide, provided for the reor-
ganization of political processes and institutions, thus broadening participation in decision-
making and institutionalizing the political structure. For example, the reorganization ex-
panded the number of political and economic units by creating fourteen provinces to replace
the six existing provincial jurisdictions. Popular Assemblies were created at the municipal,
provincial and national level to provide broader participation. See Ritter, People's Power and
the Communist Party, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION 273-75 (S. Halebsky
& J. Kirk eds. 1985).
15. The government has established the Institute of Internal Demand which regularly
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assemblies on the shop floor, 16 the municipal and provincial assem-
blies, as well as the national planning and political institutions. 7
Such participation, particularly at local levels, required the develop-
ment of new economic divisions and mechanisms for participation.18
In addition, the strengthening of the trade unions19 and development
of trained cadres of enterprise management personnel has been impor-
tant to the process. 20 The combination of centralized planning by the
State, which relies on broad based input, and decentralized manage-
ment of production is, in the words of one Cuban commentator, a
manifestation of the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism."
'2'
Implementation of reforms of the magnitude embodied in SDPE
would challenge even developed economies. In the case of Cuba, the
task was particularly difficult because many basic economic structures
and systems essential to implementation of SDPE either did not exist
or were insufficiently developed for rational economic planning.22 For
example, Cuba had not developed an adequate system for collecting,
surveys supplies, inventories and consumer tastes and opinions throughout the country. The
Institute also publishes an extremely popular monthly magazine through which Cubans sell
and trade items like televisions, cars, services, etc. Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 225.
16. The "Resolution on Economic Planning and Management System" adopted by the
Second Congress of the PCC states:
The collective workers in each work center should always help to draw up the enter-
prise's plan and participate in economic and social management. In support of this,
all the workers should be trained in the principles of the Economic Planning and
Management System, by means of the mass media, bulletin board displays, seminars,
training courses and any other measures that are effective.
2D CONG. PCC, supra note 12, at 394.
17. See Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 222-23.
18. Certain economic activity has primary significance at the municipal and provincial
levels, particularly with respect to services. The introduction of SDPE brought local control
over such economic activity which had previously been subordinated to central state minis-
tries. Thus, economic management and planning now takes place at all three levels: munici-
pal, provincial and national. Id. at 223; see also SISTEMA ECON6MICA, supra note 11, at 20.
The municipal and provincial Assemblies of Peoples' Power, established by Chapter IX of the
1976 Constitution, are authorized in Article 102 to:
establish and [direct economic entities of] . ..production and service[s] . . . which
are directly subordinated to them and carry out the activities required in order to
meet the [economic] needs . . . for the collective in the territory under the jurisdic-
tion of each.
They also aid in the development of activities and the fulfillment of plans of
those units in their territory which are not subordinate to them.
CUBA CONSTITUCION art. 102 (English edition published by Center for Cuban Studies, New
York).
19. See Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 218-19; Perez-Stable, supra note 12, at 206-303.
20. See 2D CONG. PCC, supra note 12, at 37.
21. Marill, Sabre los Contratos Econdmicos y el Arbitraje Estatal, 2 BOLETiN INFORMA-
TIVO 28, 30 (1983).
22. See Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 223.
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organizing and analyzing statistics and data essential to central eco-
nomic decision-making. 23 Thus, from 1976-80 numerous new institu-
tions were created to manage information essential to the new system,
including the State Committee for Statistics,2 4 a national accounting
system,25 state committees to regulate prices and standards, 26 and a
restructuring of the banking system.27
Moreover, if enterprises were to become self-managing and self-
financing, a system of regulating inter-enterprise transactions and as-
suring accountability had to be developed. At the time the SDPE was
introduced, however, Cuba had developed neither a system of con-
tracts applicable to implementation of a central plan28 nor a legal sys-
tem to govern the execution, validation and enforcement of such
contracts.
29
For the first time since the revolution, Cuba looked to law as a
tool to help build a socialist economic system.30 In 1977, the Council
23. Id.
24. 2D CONG. PCC, supra note 12, at 35.
25. Id. at 36.
26. Id.
27. Id. Law No. 930, February 23, 1981 conferred new authorities and responsibilities on
the National Bank of Cuba. Article 3(b) stipulates that the Bank assumes financial control of
the national production and becomes provisionally the exclusive organ which guarantees and
effects adjustments and payments between enterprises and economic organs. For a report on
recent changes in banking policy and the development of consumer savings banks in Cuba, see
Fuller, New Developments in Cuban Banking, 5 CUBATIMES 3 (1985).
28. Under the system of budgetary accounting, state enterprises did not contract with
each other for supplies and services but fulfilled directives from central agencies. Thus, no
system of inter-enterprise commercial contracts existed until 1978. See generally Marill, supra
note 21.
29. Cuba has yet to create a new civil code reflective of the changes brought about by the
revolution. Although the civil code had undergone piecemeal change from 1959 to 1975, the
law of contract had not been revised to correspond to the new economic system introduced in
1975. The first law establishing basic principles for economic contracts was passed in 1978.
Council of State, Decree-Law 15 (1978) (Normas Bisicas para los Contratos Econ6micos),
reprinted in LEGISLACI6N EcoN6MICA (1984).
30. The 1970's marked the institutionalization of the revolution when Cuba not only
expressly articulated its governmental, judicial, party and economic structure but also adopted
several other important laws which profoundly affected social relations. See generally Azicri,
Socialist Legality and Practice, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION 318-27 (S.
Halebsky & J. Kirk eds. 1985) The foundation of the institutionalization was the Cuban Con-
stitution which was adopted in 1976. Id. Other important laws codified the norms of the
revolutionary society. Id. The Family Code which was adopted in 1974 declared the nuclear
family as the primary cell of the socialist society and also articulated the equality of men and
women in the marital relationship. Cuban Family Code, preamble, § 1289 (1976) (English
edition by Cuban Ministry of Justice). A new penal code was enacted in 1979. CODIGO PE-
NAL DE LA REP. DE CUBA (1979).
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of State31 empowered the Council of Ministers to organize an arbitra-
tion system to investigate and resolve conflicts of an economic charac-
ter, pre-contractual and contractual, resulting from monetary-
mercantile relationships involving state enterprises and other various
national economic entities. 32 The Organo de Arbitraje Estatal (OAE),
as the state arbitration system of Cuba is called, was formally estab-
lished by the Council of Ministers in Decree No. 23 in 1978.13 Simul-
taneously, the Council of State established a system of economic
contracts.
34
Since the economic system it was created to regulate was itself in
the initial stages of development, the task of the OAE has not been
simply to resolve inter-enterprise contractual disputes, but also to
elaborate and regulate a system of economic accountability in its en-
tirety.35 Thus, from commencement of its operations in 1980, the
31. The Council of State is the supreme executive branch of the Cuban government.
Since the reforms introduced in the political structure in 1975, the Council of State is elected
by the National Assembly. All laws must be approved by the National Assembly. CUBA CON-
STITUCI0N ch. VII, art. 73(b). The Council of State has legislative authority to promulgate
laws when the National Assembly is not in session. Id. art. 88(c). Such laws promulgated by
the Council of State are denoted Decreto-Ley (decree law) and can be revoked by the national
assembly. Id. art. 73(ch). Laws intitiated by the National Assembly or other bodies and ap-
proved by the National Assembly are denoted simply ley (law). The Council of Ministers, the
administrative body of the government, may issue "decrees" pursuant to specific legislative
authorization granted by the Council of State or the National Assembly. Id. art. 96(j), (k). In
addition, administrative bodies, such as the OAE, may be authorized under specific legislation
to issue regulations relevant to its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Council of Ministers, Decree 60
(1979) (Reglamento Orginico de los Organos del Sistema de Arbitraje Estatal), reprinted in
LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984). Decree 60 grants the OAE authority to issue regulations.
Id. art. 35.
32. Council of State, Decree-Law 10, art. 1. (1977) (Competences de los Organos), re-
printed in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984). In 1962, the government had created Arbitration
Commissions to resolve disputes between state enterprises, government entities and the private
sector which existed at that time. The law, however, had substantial deficiencies which made
it ineffectual; arbitration was not compulsory and had no mechanism to assure completion of
decisions. Also, there was no legislation dealing with contractual relations between enter-
prises. The commissions were disbanded in 1967. Reyes Salia, El Sistema de Arbitraje Estatal
en Cuba, 20 REV. CUBANA DE DERECHO 73, 78 (1982).
33. Council of Ministers, Decree 23 (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje Orginico), re-
printed in LEGISLACI6N ECON6M1CA (1984).
34. Council of State, Decree-Law 15 (1978) (Normas Bfsicas para los Contratos
Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLACION EcoN6MICA (1984) sets forth the definitions and
principle regulations governing inter-enterprise contracts.
35. Among the objectives of the arbitration system specified in the legislation establishing
the system is "to contribute to the perfection of the SDPE and the strengthening of the method
of economic accountability on which the system rests." Council of Ministers, Decree 23, art.
2(d) (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje Orginico), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA
(1984).
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OAE has served multiple functions: adjudicating disputes, promulgat-
ing regulations, providing consultation and advice to enterprises and
economic institutions, investigating specific economic problems, and
supplying information and making recommendations to national eco-
nomic planning units.36
In general concept, the OAE is based on models found in the
Soviet Union and other Eastern European socialist countries.37 Like
many Cuban economic institutions which take their form from ex-
isting socialist models, however, the OAE has been shaped by decrees
and regulations which reflect the specific circumstances and exper-
iences of Cuba. 38 This article will describe and analyze the develop-
ment of the Cuban state arbitration system, its procedures, functions
and place in the Cuban legal system.
II. THE FUNCTION OF STATE ARBITRATION
State arbitration in socialist economies is as fundamentally differ-
ent from arbitration in capitalist systems in its purpose and function
as is the economic system it supports.
Private contract law is the fundamental regulatory device which
enables competitive markets to function.39 In a market economy, the
contract is the medium through which buyers and sellers document
their bargain and make it enforceable in a court of law. In the making
and accepting of offers, the parties generally act out of self-interest
and seek the most profitable bargain. Prices and allocation of re-
sources are determined for the market as a whole through this private
bargaining process. It is assumed that this process, left free of manip-
ulation by either the government or private parties, will satisfy con-
sumer and societal needs and yield the highest quality production at
the most efficient price. Thus, the public interest is served indirectly
by this private bargaining.
Under the Anglo-American system of contract law there is a
36. See infra notes 74-147 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of the Soviet state arbitration system see Hazard, Production Disci-
pline: The Role of State Arbitration in the USSR, 4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 297 (1982).
38. For a discussion of the differences between the functioning of economic institutions in
Cuba and the Soviet Union see generally Zimbalist, supra note 1.
39. While market exchanges could take place in the absence of contract law, Posner sug-
gests that private contract law serves three primary functions in the marketplace: it provides
an efficient system for holding parties to their bargain; it reduces the complexity of market
transactions; and it provides information which assists rational decision-making with respect
to the bargain. R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 67-69 (2d ed. 1977).
1986]
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legal obligation to make good on one's bargain.4° If a corporation
makes a contract which it cannot fulfill, it will be legally bound to pay
damages for breach. Breach of contract may be the result of ineffi-
ciency, bad fortune or the calculation that it is more economically
efficient to pay damages occasioned by the breach than to perform the
contract. The law permits this calculation. 4 1 The breaching party is
not bound to perform a contract except in very limited circumstances
where specific enforcement is awarded.
42
Arbitrators become involved in the contract process only if one
of the parties independently brings a complaint that the contract itself
is not legally binding or that it has been breached, and the parties
have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration.43 In resolving the
dispute, the arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial capacity as an impartial
fact finder, and has the authority to impose a binding decision. 44 The
arbitrator rarely is concerned with the public impact of a particular
dispute. Where important societal considerations are concerned, as in
resolution of antitrust issues, public policy dictates that such disputes
be adjudicated by a court of law and not by arbitration.
45
In contrast, in the present Cuban socialist economy, a contract is
not the expression of an independent bargain reflecting private inter-
ests, but an instrument in the implementation of a national economic
plan which attempts to allocate resources to provide the greatest and
40. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 581 (1970).
41. Posner argues that the law should not discourage such "economic" breaches. R. Pos-
NER, supra note 39, at 88-90.
42. Under the Anglo-American legal system, specific enforcement is an equitable remedy
which is granted in the absence of the availability of adequate legal remedies. See J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 40, at 581. Generally, the plaintiff can be made whole by
receipt of monetary damages in which case specific performance will be denied. Id. The com-
mon exception has been in contracts for the sale of land because land is thought to be unique,
making compensatory damages an inadequate substitute. Id. at 581-82.
43. Commercial arbitration is not compulsory. The parties either agree in the original
contract to submit disputes to arbitration or do so at the time that the dispute arises. M.
DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (1968). An excep-
tion to the general rule of voluntary arbitration occurred with the functioning of the National
War Labor Boards under the War Labor Disputes Act passed in 1943. The institution of
mandatory arbitration within the guidelines of the war wage stabilization program was based
on the requirement for resolution of disputes consistent with the war emergency. In operation,
they were analogous to state arbitration systems in the character of resolution dependent on
perception of public interest and not wholly dependent on the interests and legal claims of
parties before board. See F. WITNEY, GOVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 547-80
(1951).
44. M. DOMKE, supra note 43, § 21.02.
45. Id. § 19.04. Arbitration awards may also be set aside when the awards or the arbitra-
tion agreement itself is against public policy. Id. § 33.03.
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most equitable societal benefit. 46 The plan outlines the annual pro-
duction and service goals to be achieved by state enterprises. In broad
terms, the quantities and prices of goods to be produced are deter-
mined by the plan.47 The plan is then elaborated and made more spe-
cific and implemented through the negotiation of "planned"
contracts48 entered into to implement it. Since the enterprises are self-
financing, self-managing and accountable for profitability, they have
the flexibility and incentive to contract with other enterprises and to
negotiate terms which serve their efficiency and profit-maximizing
objectives.
49
The parties to a prospective contract have a duty not only to
engage in "planned" contracts, but also to demand performance of
such contracts. 50 Thus, state arbitration proceedings are brought not
only to resolve disputes over performance of contracts, but also to
resolve disputes which arise in the formation and execution of the
contract. If parties do not enter into "planned" contracts, the OAE
can commence an action on its own initiative to bring the parties to an
agreement.
5'
Similarly, since fulfillment of the national plan requires the per-
formance of all "planned" contracts, enterprises have a duty to exe-
46. For a discussion of the role of contracts in the Cuban economy, see Marill, supra note
21, at 29-41. Under previous systems of economic planning and management in Cuba, direc-
tives as to production came from central state bodies, thus relieving the necessity of inter-
enterprise contracts. The economy suffered from lack of discipline and accountability, and
inefficiencies resulting from the inability of central agencies to oversee production. See supra
notes 5-10 and accompanying text. The institution of SDPE and the granting of management
autonomy to enterprises, made the contract the primary mechanism for the internal ordering
of economic activities.
47. See Marill, supra note 21, at 33.
48. Council of State, Decree-Law 15, art. 4 (1978) (Normas Bisicas para los Contratos
Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLAcI6N ECON6MICA (1984). "Planned" contracts are those
which implement the national economic plan. There are also unplanned, or "nonplanificado,"
contracts. These are contracts which an enterprise can enter into on its own initiative with
surplus supplies or services not necessary to fulfill the national plan. Id. art. 5.
49. Such terms would include specifications as to quality, quantities, date of delivery,
terms of payment, responsibility for transport, storage, etc. See Marill, supra note 21, at 33.
50. The statute regulating economic contracts expressly defines "planned contracts" as
those which are related to the completion of the plan and the execution of which is obligatory.
Council of State, Decree-Law 15, art. 4 (1978) (Normas Bisicas para los Contratos
Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984). It also provides that if a dispute
arises in the negotiation of a "planned contract," the OAE will intervene to resolve the dispute.
Id. art. 33. The right and duty of an enterprise to demand the execution of a "planned con-
tract" flow from this obligation. See LEGISLACION ECON6MICA xviii (S. Rivas ed. 1984).
51. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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cute and fulfill contracts, as well as bring claims for breach. 52
Moreover, since funds for material rewards depend on profitability,
enterprises have a self-interest in making claims for damages resulting
from breach. 53 Damages alone, however, are not a sufficient remedy
since the contracted for performance is not generally available from
another source.54 Thus, to enable the injured enterprise to fulfill its
obligations under the plan, the breaching enterprise is obligated to
perform the contract in addition to paying damages.
In theory, the interests of enterprises and the national interest in
completion of the economic plan are mutually supportive. The sys-
tem is designed to reinforce the fusion of the self-interest of the enter-
prises to maximize profitability and the societal interest in fulfillment
of the plan with maximum efficiency. 55 As the juridical body charged
with defending the social interest in the completion of the national
economic plan, the OAE plays an essential role in balancing these
interests. 56 Specifically, the OAE functions to enforce contractual ob-
ligations and to protect the interests and rights of self-managing state
enterprises in their contractual relations. 57 The protection and promo-
tion of these interests provide the criteria which guide the activities
52. See infra note 93; see also Marill, supra note 21, at 34.
53. In addition to profit incentives, the possibility of sanctions motivate enterprise man-
agers to make claims for breach of contract. Council of State, Decree-Law 36, art. 4 (1980)
(Sobre la Disciplina de los Dirigentes y Funcionarios Administrados Estatles) states that:
It is an infraction of discipline on the part of the directors and the functionaries in
the exercise of their responsibilities to:
(e) be personally responsible for the incompletion of an economic contract, when it
is so established by the competent arbitration organ.
(w) not to agree to economic contracts in the time limits established by the compe-
tent authorities through negligence or other cause imputable to them.
Failure to bring an action for breach will often result in the inability of the affected enterprise
to fulfill its contractual obligations. Id.
54. For a more detailed discussion of remedies in the Cuban arbitration system, see infra
text accompanying notes 124-32.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 169-78.
56. Council of Ministers, Decree 23, art. 2(c) (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje Orgfnico),
reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984).
57. These objectives are specifically stated by the Council of Ministers in Decree 23
which established the state arbitration system:
c) To defend the social interest and to guarantee, at the same time, the interests and
rights of the socialist economic enterprises and the other parties in their contractual
relations.
Council of Ministers, Decree 23, ch. 1, art. 2(c) (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje Orginico),
reprinted in LEGISLAC16N ECON6MICA (1984).
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and decisionmaking of the OAE.58
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE OAE
State arbitration in Cuba functions at three levels: national, pro-
vincial and ministerial. 59 The national OAE (OAEN), which has
seven arbitrators appointed by the Council of Ministers, 6° has juris-
diction to hear certain cases of national significance and controversies
involving the Ministry of Armed Forces, the Ministry of the Interior
and enterprises engaged in foreign trade.61 The OAEN also reviews
decisions of the provincial bodies under special circumstances.62 In
addition, it is responsible for the administration of the entire arbitra-
tion system, the promulgation of regulations pertaining to arbitration
procedures and the supervision of provincial and ministry level bod-
ies. 63 Finally, the OAEN coordinates and performs most of the re-
search and development projects of the OAE. 64
58. The fusion of the interest of the enterprise with the social interest is discussed infra
text accompanying notes 170-77.
59. Council of Ministers, Decree 23, arts. 5-15 (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje Orgiin-
ico), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984).
60. One of the arbitrators is designated by the Council of Ministers to be the principal
arbitrator or director of the management council of the OAEN. Id. art. 6. The OAEN also
has a Secretary whose staff serves a function analogous to that of a court clerk. Id.; see also
infra notes 100-06. There are also several other departments including the Department of
Planning, Department of Inspection, and Department of Research. Regarding the role of
these departments see infra text accompanying notes 136-48.
61. Council of Ministers, Decree 119, art. 3 (1983) (Reglas para Determinar la Com-
petencia de los Organos de Arbitraje Estatal), reprinted in BOLETfN INFORMATIVO (1984).
Decree 119 modified the jurisdiction of the national OAE as set forth in Decree 47 (1979).
Originally, jurisdicition was based on the peso value of the contract. Thus, the national body
would hear pre-contractual disputes where the total value of the contract was over 250,000
pesos or claims for damages where the amount claimed was over 25,000 pesos. Council of
Ministers, Decree 47, art. 1 (1977) (Disposici6n Autorizante), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N
ECON6MICA (1984). By 1983, the number of cases system-wide had grown from 539 in 1981
to well over 14,000. Interview with Miguel Reyes Salia, Principal Arbitrator OAEN, Havana,
Cuba (May 23, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Reyes Interview]. The national body could not
handle this load and also fulfill its other responsibilities. Id. Moreover, in the three years since
the system was inaugurated, provincial bodies had gained sufficient expertise to hear more
cases. As a result, the jurisdictional provisions were modified to give the provincial bodies
jurisdiction over all cases with the exception of those which are reserved to the OAEN by
Decree 119 and those which arise within ministries which have their own internal arbitration
body. Council of Ministers, Decree 119, arts. 4-6.
62. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 111 (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del Arbitraje
Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLAcI6N ECON6MICA (1984). See also infra text accompanying
notes 131-34.
63. Council of Ministers, Decree 60, art. 12 (1978) (Reglamento Orginico de los Organos
del Sistema de Arbitraje Estatal).
64. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J
Each of the fourteen provinces has an OAE unit, Organo de
Arbitraje Estatal Territorial (OAET), which has jurisdiction to hear
disputes not heard by the national body or by the ministry level arbi-
trators.65 The provincial bodies have three arbitrators appointed by
the OAEN with the exception of Havana Province which has five.
66
There are sixteen state entities and ministries which are so large
that they require their own internal arbitration systems.67 The Sugar
Ministry (MINAZ), for example, has a staff of three arbitrators who
resolve disputes between the various enterprises within the ministry.
68
A dispute between a ministry such as MINAZ or one of its enterprises
and an outside enterprise or another ministry, however, would be
taken to the provincial or national OAE.69 Ministry arbitrators are
selected by the director of the respective ministry.
70
The various bodies of the OAE also draw on a pool of experts
who assist in the resolution of disputes. 71 These consultants are
loaned by ministries or other institutions to the OAE to assist in spe-
cific conflicts. 72 They receive a salary from the entity which employs
them and no additional payment from the OAE.73
IV. INTERVENTION AT THE PRE-CONTRACTUAL STAGE
Since no system of economic contracts existed to regulate com-
65. Council of Ministers, Decree 119 Cuarto (1983) (Reglas Para Determinar la Com-
petencia de los Organos de Arbitraje Estatal) (repealing Council of Ministers, Decree 47 (1979)
(Competencia de los Organos), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984)).
66. Interview with Dr. Benito Besada, Vice President of the OAEN, in Havana, Cuba
(May 23, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Besada Interview]. Council of Ministers, Decree 60, art.
75 establishes a minimum staff for territorial organs of three arbitrators and a secretary.
Council of Ministers, Decree 60 (1977) (Reglamento Orginico de los Organos del Sistema de
Arbitraje Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984).
67. The ministries which have internal arbitration systems are: Heavy Industry, Light
Industry, Sugar, Fishing, Agriculture, Interior Commerce, Construction, Armed Forces, Nu-
trition, Transportation, Interior, Basic Industry, and Public Health. In addition, the Institutes
of Tourism and of Radio and Television have their own arbitration systems as does the State
Committee of Technical Material Supply. Reyes Interview, supra note 61.
68. Although integrated vertically into a single ministry, the various enterprises must
enter into formal planned contracts with each other. Arbitration may be required to resolve
disputes between enterprises at different levels of sugar production: cultivation, processing and
distribution.
69. Council of Ministers, Decree 119, (1983) (Relas Para Determinar la Competencia de
los Organos de Arbitraje Estatal).
70. Council of Ministers, Decree 60, art. 96 (1977) (Relamento 6rginico de los Organos
del Sistema de Arbitraje Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984).
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mercial transactions between enterprises prior to 1975,'74 few manage-
ment personnel understood the requirements of economic contracts or
had experience in the drafting and negotiation of contracts. 7 In fact,
enterprise managers did not fully appreciate the new economic sys-
tem.76 Decree-Law 15 governing the general nature of contractual
obligations between enterprises was issued in 1978, 77 but its imple-
mentation was impeded by the lack of experience and understanding
among enterprise management. The Main Report to the Second Con-
gress of the Communist Party noted this in 1980:
The system of economic contracting is being established and devel-
oped, even though difficulties have arisen due to lack of full under-
standing of the importance of such contracts in carrying out the
plan.
78
Because inexperienced management posed a significant impedi-
ment to implementation of the new system, the OAE, when it began
functioning in 1980, emphasized providing technical assistance to
management of the state enterprises, especially in the drafting of con-
tracts. 79 Regional seminars were organized by the OAE staff to teach
management personnel and their legal advisors the importance of con-
tracts in the new economic system, as well as how to draft and negoti-
74. The government is currently in the process of drafting a new civil code to replace the
existing pre-revolutionary law. Although the civil code which existed in 1975 contained provi-
sions pertaining to contracts, the law was based on principles consistent with free enterprise
and did not satisfy the requirements of a socialist economy. See Marill, supra note 21, at 29.
Therefore, it could not be applied to inter-enterprise relations under the restructured organiza-
tion of the economy.
75. Dorticos, Discurso, 1 BOLETIN INFORMATIvO 4, 5-6 (1982). This speech, which was
published by the OAE in its first volume of the Boletin Informativo, was given on November
17, 1980 at the inauguration of the jurisdictional activity of the OAE. Dorticos is the vice-
president of the Council of State. It is important to keep in mind that a substantial portion, if
not most, of the corporate managers before 1959 were either North Americans or Cubans who
left after the revolution.
76. Id.
77. Council of State, Decree-Law 15 (1978) (Normas Bisicas para los Contratos
Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984). The preamble to the Decree
Law explains the necessity of establishing a system of contracts which imposes legal obliga-
tions on the parties to fulfill agreements and answer for nonperformance. Id.
78. 2D CONG. PCC, supra note 12, at 35. Among the resolutions passed at the Second
Congress were several calling for the issuance of regulations pertaining to the form and special
requirements for economic contracts and for the development of contract legislation, including
sanctions for failure to comply, applicable to all sectors and branches of the national economy.
Id. at 193.
79. Educational programs were also implemented to train management personnel. Id. at
37. Enterprises also have staff legal advisors which are increasingly important to improvement
of the quality of drafting contracts. Reyes Interview, supra note 61.
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ate contracts.8 0  Seminars are still conducted today to explain new
regulations and to discuss problems which have been identified by ar-
bitrators and management."1
Increasingly, enterprises have managers or legal advisors who
possess training and expertise in the contract process.8 2 Where such
expertise is lacking, the trained arbitrator may be asked by one of the
parties to intervene to assure that a contract is executed and that it
contains the necessary legal clauses.8 3 Further, if the parties are not
able to agree, or one party refuses to sign a proposed contract, one or
both may request OAE intervention to resolve the dispute.8 4 In the
event a planned contract is not executed and neither party seeks inter-
vention by the OAE, the OAE may initiate a proceeding on its own,
"de oficio," to require execution of the contract.8 5 The function of the
OAE is not to impose terms on the parties, but to get the enterprises
to agree on fundamental provisions necessary to fulfill their obliga-
tions under the national plan.
8 6
Initially, enterprises did not readily execute contracts or bring
claims against enterprises which failed to do so. The problem was
noted by the Principal Arbitrator Miguel Reyes Salia at the First Ple-
nary Session on Arbitration and Contracts in 1981.8 7 This failure to
make claims was attributed to inexperience, inertia and passivity.
88
According to Dr. Reyes, almost 69 percent of the cases handled by
80. Dorticos, supra note 75, at 8.
81. Besada Interview, supra note 66.
82. 2D CONG. PCC, supra note 12, at 37.
83. Besada Interview, supra note 66.
84. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 7 (1981) (Relas Procedimiento del Arbitaje Es-
tatal), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984) authorizes the OAE to resolve disputes in
the pre-contractural stage. Decree-Law 15, art. 33, sets forth not only the norms for inter-
enterprise contracts, but also provides for intervention by the OAE if the parties to a proposed
contract do not reach an agreement. Council of State, Decree-Law 15 (1978) (Normas Bisicas
para los Contratos Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984).
85. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, arts. 106-07 (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del Arbi-
traje Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984). The OAE may learn of failures
of enterprises to execute required contracts by means of a third party who is affected by the
situation, other state reporting mechanisms, or by means of the OAE's own inspection proce-
dures. In the initial years of its existence, the OAE frequently sent arbitrators to visit enter-
prises, to discuss the system and to review contracts executed by the enterprises. Besada
Interview, supra note 66.
86. The arbitrator does, however, have authority to nullify provisions if they are not
lawful. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 8(c) (1981) (Reglas Proceimiento del Arbitraje
Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLAClON ECON6MICA (1984).
87. Address by Dr. Miguel Reyes Salia, First Plenary Session on Arbitration and Eco-
nomic Contracts, (Sept. 1981), reprinted in 2 BOLETIN INFORMATIVO 7 (1982).
88. Id. See also Reyes Interview, supra note 61.
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the OAE in 1981 involved the "de oficio" process.89 As a result, regu-
lations promulgated by the OAEN the following year gave arbitrators
discretion to impose pecuniary sanctions on enterprises which were
negligent in fulfilling their obligation to execute planned contracts. 90
By 1983, the number of "de oficio" proceedings dropped to less than
40 percent. Dr. Reyes attributes the decline to two reasons: 1) the
imposition of monetary sanctions; and 2) greater familiarity with im-
proved understanding of the system.9'
Thus, one of the OAE's important functions is to prevent
problems which might arise in the formation of contracts either from
the failure of enterprises to execute a required contract or from con-
tracts which are incomplete or poorly drafted. As enterprise manage-
ment personnel have become more experienced, this aspect of the
OAE's work has decreased, but it still remains significant to the devel-
opment and functioning of the economic system.
92
V. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Breach of a "planned" contract not only has consequences for
the affected enterprise, but also for the economy as a whole. It causes
a breakdown in the implementation of the economic plan. Thus, en-
terprises have a legal right and obligation to make a claim to the OAE
for any breach of a required agreement. 93 In this way, the system
relies on decentralized enterprises and not on centralized agencies to
enforce obligations under the plan. Because of the significant societal
interest in the fulfillment of contractual obligations, the OAE, as in
the case of non-execution of a required contract,94 may act "de oficio"
to require enterprises to answer for nonfulfillment of a contract when
89. Id. Not all of these de oficio proceedings, however, involved pre-contractual
problems. The procedure is also used to bring parties to arbitration when a contract is not
fulfilled. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
90. Instruction No. J-34, (Oct. 13, 1982) 3 BOLETIN INFORMATIVO 66 (1984). Fines
imposed pursuant to this regulation are to be paid to the Department of Revenue of the munic-
ipality where the entity or entities are domiciled. Id.
91. Reyes Interview, supra note 61.
92. Id.
93. Although not explicitly stated in the regulations, this obligation is implicit in the duty
to fulfill one's obligation under the plan and in the power of the state arbitrators to bring the
parties to the OAE in the event a party fails to seek reclamation for breach of a "planned"
contract. See generally Marill, supra note 21, at 34. The inherent duty is also mentioned in
Instruction No. J-14, which gives the OAE authority to impose sanctions for negligent failure
to bring a claim for breach. Id. (Nov. 27, 1981) 3 BOLETIN INFORMATIVO 33 (1984).
94. See supra note 85.
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the injured enterprise fails to bring a claim on its own. 95
Nonperformance of a single contract may have an immediate ef-
fect on other sectors of the economy. To minimize the impact, in-
stances of nonperformance must be identified and rectified as quickly
as possible. By law, claims for breach of contract must be brought
within a short period of time, ranging from five to forty-five days after
the breach occurs, depending on the nature of the claim. 96 The law
and regulations do not bar claims or set forth any penalty for bringing
claims after the specified time periods elapse. Clearly, it serves the
interest of the system to have the claim brought even if it is not
timely. The OAE does have the discretion, however, to assess costs,
and therefore, it may be likely that in cases where claims are not
timely made, the claimant will have to pay all or a portion of the
costs. 97 Claims are processed quickly and generally decided by the
OAE within 45 days of filing.
98
Rules of procedure elaborated by OAEN regulations 99 reinforce
95. Such cases come to the attention of the OAE through various sources including ran-
dom site visits to enterprises or third parties who are affected by the non-fulfillment. Besada
Interview supra note 66. In instances of de oficio proceedings, where failure to bring the action
is not excused, damages assessed are paid into a state account and are not awarded to the
enterprise injured by the breach. This rule serves to give added incentive to management to
identify breaches and make claims promptly. Instruction No. J-14, (Nov. 27, 1981) 3 BOLETiN
INFORMATIVO 33 (1984).
96. Statutes setting forth the requirements of specific kinds of contracts, for example sup-
ply contracts, transport contracts, or investment contracts, contain regulations pertaining to
the time in which claims must be brought to the attention of the breaching party. See, e.g.,
Council of Ministers, Decree 53, art. 87 (1978) (Reglamento de las Condiciones Generales del
Contrato de Suministro), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N EcON6MICA (1984). In addition, the
OAE has issued instructions which detail the required time limits for bringing a claim to the
OAE. Instruction No. J-12, issued by the National State Arbitration Organ on July 10, 1981
to clarify Decree 53, Chapter VI (pertaining to claims) provides time periods for filing claims.
For example, a claim for non-delivery or partial delivery must be made within 20 days of the
date promised. Instruction No. J-12, § l(a), (July 10, 1981) 3 BOLETiN INFORMATIVO 21
(1984). Similarly, a claim for damaged goods must be made 20 days after receipt of the goods.
Id. § 1(c). More time, 40 days, is allowed for claims based on non-conforming quality or
specifications. Id. § l(ch). Damages can also be claimed for delivery before the agreed upon
delivery date, if the claimant can show it incurred additional costs such as warehousing, due to
the early delivery. Such claims must be made within five days of receipt of the goods. Id.
§ 1(b).
97. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, arts. 58-59 (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del Arbi-
traje Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLAcI6N EcoN6MICA (1984).
98. Interview with Roberto Francisco, Specialist from Department of Inspection OAEN,
Havana, Cuba (May 25, 1984).
99. The Rules of Procedure for the State Arbitration System are contained in Decree 89,
which was issued by the Council of Ministers in May 1981, six months after the inauguration
of the state arbitration system. Provisional Rules of Procedure were established by the OAEN
prior to adoption of Decree 89. Reyes Interview, supra note 61. The rules have been elabo-
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the expeditious nature of arbitration proceedings. To initiate a claim,
an enterprise must submit a demand setting forth the factual allega-
tions in writing to the OAE and send a copy to the respondent. 100 At
the time a demand is filed, the Secretary assigns the case to one of the
arbitrators 10 ' who reviews the demand. The arbitrator then makes a
determination that the demand satisfies all formal requirements10 2
and that it states a claim under the law. 10 3 Once a complaint is admit-
ted, the respondent or defendant must be served in writing within
three days.' °4 The respondent must submit its answer in writing to
the OAE within seven days.' 0 5 The arbitrator assigned by the Secre-
tary remains in charge of the case; parties do not have any choice with
respect to which arbitrator will be assigned. 106
Because resolution affects the national economy directly, not
simply one transaction, fact-finding must be as thorough and accurate
as possible. The arbitrator has broad discretion to accept or reject
proof offered by the parties. 107 All forms of evidence are admitted in
the arbitration process including documents, declarations of the par-
ties or their legal representatives or other witnesses, demonstrative ev-
idence, and expert opinion. 10 8 Elaborate rules of evidence contained
in Decree 89, Chapter 14, are designed to assure accuracy and relia-
bility of evidence introduced at arbitration. In addition, an arbitrator
can, on his or her own initiative, seek additional evidence. For exam-
ple, an arbitrator can decide to conduct fact finding on location, 10 9
and can order production of additional evidence or witnesses consid-
rated on by regulations promulgated by the OAEN. The regulations are developed by the
Planning Department of the OAEN and approved by the Council of Ministers. Interview with
Clara Diaz, Planning Department OAEN, in Havana, Cuba (May 25, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Diaz Interview].
100. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 74 (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del Arbitraje
Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLAcI6N EcON6MICA (1984).
101. Id. art. 75.
102. The formal requirements are set forth in Decree 89, art. 74. These requirements apply
to pre-contractual claims as well as for claims of breach of contract. Id. If the demand does
not comply, the claimant has three days to amend. Id. art. 76.
103. Id. art. 76.
104. Id. art. 77.
105. Id.
106. Id. art. 15.
107. Id. arts. 85-105.
108. Id. art. 86. Documentary evidence must be in its original form; copies substituted for
originals must be notarized. Id. art. 88. Objections to the introduction of specific evidence are
permitted at any stage of the process. Id. Expert testimony (Id. art. 93) is limited to related
issues or details and must be provided in writing. Id. art. 96.
109. Id. art. 98.
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ered necessary to the resolution of the dispute. 110
The law provides that liability for breach lies only "when there
exists blame imputable to the breaching party; intentional or by negli-
gence."11  The regulations of the OAE, however, do not mention the
burden of proof in contract disputes. One commentator suggests that
the burden be on the claimant to prove the fact of a breach of contract
and that the defendant be required to prove lack of culpability or re-
sponsibility. 1 2 In the present development of the system, precise
specification of burdens seems unnecessary and irrelevant since the
arbitrators have such wide fact-finding and decision-making pow-
ers. I 3 Further, since the arbitrator's primary responsibility is to serve
the national economic interests, the arbitrator is presumably con-
cerned foremost with the appropriate resolution of a dispute in the
context of the national economy and not with formalistic burdens.
There remains, however, a substantial question as to what consti-
tutes negligence. So far, the OAE has not answered this question.
Some assistance in resolving this question is found in instructions is-
sued by the Council of Directors of the OAEN which notes that the
statute governing liability is silent on the issue of "fuerza mayor," or
natural forces, which prevent performance. 1 4 The instruction grants
authority to the OAE to exonerate a party from responsibility on
these grounds." 5 Presumably, then, negligence would encompass all
acts within the control of the contracting party including failure to
demand performance from a third party which causes the breach."
6
Disputes are resolved through the issuance of the arbitrator's de-
110. Id. arts. 100-01. For example, in a dispute between two agricultural cooperatives and
a pesticide enterprise which used aerial spraying in Pinar del Rio, the arbitrator from the
OAET visited the site and went up in the airplane to see how the mistake was made. The
pesticide enterprise was exonerated for damage caused from spraying the wrong pesticide
when it was shown that the cooperatives had used the wrong signals. Reyes Interview, supra
note 61.
111. Council of State, Decree-Law 15, art. 40 (1978) (Normas Bisicas Para Los Contratos
Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984).
112. Marill, supra note 21, at 37.
113. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
114. Instruction No. J-29, (May 25, 1982) 3 BOLETIN INFORMATIVO (1984).
115. Id.
116. The disciplinary code applicable to enterprise managers provides sanctions against a
manager who is "personally responsible for the incompletion of an economic contract, when so
established by the competent organ of state arbitration" or who does not enter into planned
contract for reasons of personal negligence. Council of State, Decree-Law 36, art. 4(e), (w)
(1980) (Sobre la Disciplina de los Dirigentes y Funcionarios Administradores Estatales).
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cision at the end of the arbitration process (Laudo) 117 or by proce-
dural rulings made prior to the arbitration hearing (Auto). Il8
Settlement agreements which are mutually binding must be approved
by the assigned arbitrator.11 9 When a dispute is resolved through an
arbitrator's decision, and the arbitrator finds that the breach is imput-
able to one of the parties, 20 the arbitrator has jurisdiction to award
damages, including lost profits, and to impose other pecuniary sanc-
tions as well as litigation costs.12 l
Remedies also must necessarily reflect both the interests of the
injured enterprise and the societal interest in completion of the eco-
nomic plan. The injured enterprise is entitled to compensation for
actual damages including lost profits. 122 Execution of the judgment is
automatically effected by a transfer of funds by the National Bank.123
If the culpable party lacks the funds to pay the damages exacted, pay-
ment is referred to the State Committee of Finance. 24
Because fulfillment of the plan is paramount and since enter-
prises have a continuing duty to fulfill their obligations under the
plan, imposition of damages does not relieve the breaching party from
its obligation to perform the contract. 25 Thus, the contract must be
fulfilled except in cases where the benefit has been lost and perform-
ance would be of no value. In instances where the plan itself must be
modified because circumstances indicate that it is inadequate or can-
not be fulfilled, the arbitrator has the authority to order modification
117. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, arts. 43-44 (1981) (Reglos Procedimiento del Arbi-
traje Estatel), reprinted in LEGISLACi6N ECON6MICA (1984).
118. Id. art. 41. Auto also refers to other decisions concluding an arbitration procedure
before the hearing on the merits. Id. For example, an auto would issue rejecting a demand for
lack of jurisdiciton. Id.
119. Council of Ministers, Decree 23, art. 26 (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje Orginico),
reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984).
120. Decree-Law 15, art. 40 states that material responsiblity for breach ofcontract is only
found "when culpability can be imputed to the breaching party: intentional or neglect."
Council of State, Decree-Law 15, art. 40 (1978) (Normas Bisicas para los Contratos
Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984).
121. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, arts. 30(0, 58 (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del
Arbitraje Estatal) (damages, pecuniary sanctions, and costs), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N
EcON6MICA (1984).
122. Id. arts. 30, 44; Besada Interview, supra note 66.
123. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 127 (1981), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N
ECON6MICA (1984).
124. Id. art. 126.
125. Council of State, Decree-Law 15, art. 38 (1978) (Normas Bisicas Para Los Contratos
Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984).
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of contracts dictated by changes in the plan. 126 The arbitrator, how-
ever, does not have authority to order modification of the national
plan.127 Recommendations based on the arbitrator's investigations or
findings are sent to the Central Planning Board. 128 . Contracts which
are "nonplanificado" (unplanned) may be modified by agreement of
the parties. 12
9
In addition to damages and specific performance, the OAE may
award penalties. 130 The types and amounts of penalties are set forth
in statutes regulating specific kinds of contracts. For example, the
statute regulating supply contracts states that failure to deliver the
contracted supplies on time results in a penalty amounting to .05 per-
cent of the value of the supplies not delivered calculated for each day
of non-delivery during the first 30 days.' 3' The penalty is raised to .08
percent each day for the next 30 days; 12 percent for each day over
sixty days. The penalty may not exceed 8 percent of the total value of
the affected goods. 32
Although there is no provision for appeal of an arbitrator's deci-
sion, a rehearing is available when new elements arise that could affect
the outcome, or when the arbitrator has failed to appreciate a particu-
lar fact or right.133 Such proceedings, known as "revisiones," are
taken to the next high level in the arbitration system, not to a court.
In the event that a "revision" is sought of a decision made at the
national arbitration level, it is taken up by a panel of three national
126. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 30(f) (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del Arbi-
traje Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984). A signed "planned" contract
can only be modified when the Plan it serves to fulfill has itself been modified. Council of
State, Decree-Law 15, art. 35 (1978) (Normas Bisicas Para Los Contratos Econ6micos), re-
printed in LEGISLACI6N EcON6MICA (1984).
127. Besada Interview, supra note 66.
128. Id.
129. Council of States, Decree-Law 15, art. 36 (1978) (Normas Bisicas Para Los Con-
tratos Econ6micos), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984).
130. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 30(f) (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del Arbi-
traje Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984).
131. Council of Ministers, Decree 53, art. 98 (1978) (Reglamento de las Condiciones
Generales del Contrato de Suministro), reprinted in LEGISLACION EcON6MICA (1984).
132. Id.
133. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 111 (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del Arbitraje
Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLACI6N EcON6MICA (1984). This process is different from an
"appeal" in Cuba in which a party may take a case to the next higher court which will hear the
evidence de novo. Such appeals do not require a showing of error by the lower court. Besada
Interview, supra note 66.
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arbitrators none of whom were involved in the original decision. 13 4 In
1984, revision proceedings constituted about 50 percent of the work of
the OAEN, but the number was expected to decrease as the arbitra-
tors gained greater expertise in resolving cases.
35
VI. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
A third function of the OAE is related to development and plan-
ning. The importance of the OAE as a source of information con-
cerning the functioning of not only particular industries and
enterprises but also the economy as a whole, has been reiterated in a
number of decrees and regulations. 36 Article 10 of Decree 60 which
was issued to elaborate Decree Number 23 establishing the arbitration
system, states that among the principle functions of the OAE is to
advise central planning agencies of whatever deficiencies the OAE de-
tects in the system and to propose methods of correcting them.
1 37
Moreover, the OAE is charged with organizing a system or research
and analysis concerning economic contracts 3 8 and with investigating
the causes of litigation for the purpose of proposing measures to pre-
vent such disputes. 139 Thus, based on its experience with various in-
dustries, particular disputes, and its own research, the OAE makes
recommendations to the economic planning agencies such as the Na-
tional Bank, the State Committee for Finance and others directly in-
volved in state economic planning as well as to the management of
particular enterprises. 140
Investigation and research is primarily carried out by the De-
partment of Planning of the OAEN.141 The department has different
134. Council of Ministers, Decree 89, art. 115 (1981) (Reglas Procedimiento del Arbitraje
Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLACi6N EcON6MICA (1984).
135. Besada Interveiw, supra note 66.
136. See, e.g., Council of Ministers, Decree 23, art. 3 (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje
Orginico), reprinted in LEGISLAci6N ECON6MICA (1984); Council of Ministers, Decree 60,
art. 10(g)-(k) (1977) (Reglamento Orglinico de los Organos del Sistema de Arbitraje Estatal),
reprinted in LEGISLACION ECON6MICA (1984).
137. Council of Ministers, Decree 60, art. 10(i) (1977) (Reglamento Organico de los Orga-
nos del Sistema de Arbitraje Estatal), reprinted in LEGISLAci6N ECON6MICA (1984).
138. Id. art. 10(j).
139. Id. art. 10(k).
140. Besada Interview, supra note 66. See also Council of Ministers, Decree 60, ch. III,
sections g-k (1977) (Reglamento Orginico de los Organos del Sistema de Arbitraje Estatal),
reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984).
141. The OAEN has a research staff of fourteen. The territorial bodies do not have re-
search departments, but territorial arbitrators themselves often work with the OAEN on re-
search projects. Diaz Interview, supra note 99.
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functions: perfecting the legislation and regulations pertaining to ar-
bitration; perfecting the internal organization of the arbitration sys-
tem; and conducting research to discover the causes of particular
recurrent problems. 142 In addition to its own staff, the department
utilizes specialists from the various industries who are, in effect,
loaned by the industries and enterprises to work with the OAEN on
particular projects. 143
An example of a research project conducted by the Department
of Planning, is the 1983 investigation of the milk industry. In re-
sponse to recurrent disputes over quality standards among milk pro-
ducers, processors and distributors, the OAEN assembled a team to
investigate the situation. 44 The team consisted of members of the
planning department staff, representatives from the territorial arbitra-
tion units, specialists in the dairy industry, representatives from the
relevant ministries including health, standards and planning, and rep-
resentatives from the enterprises involved. 45 As a result of a year-
long study based on a sample of enterprises from all over the country,
the OAEN proposed and drafted new legislation.1 46 In 1984, the
OAEN began a study of agricultural cooperatives, specifically the eco-
nomic relationships between producers and distributors of
vegetables. 1
47
To fulfill its regulatory functions, the OAE must identify trouble
spots in the implementation of the plan. The Department of Planning
becomes aware of problems through a variety of means. Statistical
data is obtained from the enterprises and ministries regarding the
number of planned contracts required to be signed and the number
actually signed. 148 Department members also select a cross-section of
contracts to review in order to assess conformity to general require-
ments. The work plan of the department also contemplates a number
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Diaz Interview, supra note 99.
145. Id.
146. The legislation which had governed the relationship between producer and processor
dated back to 1940 when Cuba had a very small dairy industry. In 1959, Cuba imported more
than 70% of its dairy products. From 1962 to 1979, milk production in Cuba increased by
300%. M. BENJAMIN, J. COLLINS & M. ScoTT, supra note 2, at 141. According to Diaz, the
enormous expansion in the scale of production and the reorganization of agriculture in general
necessitated changes in regulations. Diaz Interview, supra note 99.
147. Diaz Interview, supra note 99.
148. Id.
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of visits to various enterprises to interview personnel. 49 In addition,
the department organizes meetings of groups of enterprises to discuss
common problems.' 50
At this early phase in the development of the SDPE, the OAE is
in a unique position to uncover existing and potential problems in the
implementation of the new system. It also has almost immediate
knowledge of breakdowns, or nonperformance, in particular areas
which may have consequences for other sectors of the economy.
Thus, its research and reporting function is critical to correcting defi-
ciencies and in improving central decision-making in general.
VII. STATE ARBITRATION AND SOCIALIST LEGALITY
Although it has many characteristics of a court of justice, the
OAE was created as an organ of the central administration of the
state, annexed to the Council of Ministers.' 5' It is not administered
by the Ministry of Justice as are the People's Tribunals. 52 Since Arti-
cle 121 of the Cuban Constitution dictates that "the function of ad-
ministering justice springs from the people and is cared out. . . by
the People's Supreme Court," the constitutionality of creating such a
body which has jurisdictional powers separate from the court system
was not initially clear.1
53
Cuban jurists have resolved the potential constitutional conflict
by pointing out that Article 17 of the Constitution grants the state the
authority to "organize enterprises and other economic entities for the
administration of the socialist property.' 54 Article 17 further pro-
vides that the system governing their economic relations will be pre-
scribed by law.1 55 Thus, it is argued that since the OAE is an
administrative body the essential objective of which is to regulate in-
ter-enterprise contractual relations, its powers are derived from Arti-
cle 17, not Article 121.156 Moreover, since the Constitution was being
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Council of Ministers, Decree 23, First Por Cuanto (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje





155. CUBA CONSTITUCI6N art. 51.
156. See Vega, El Arbitraje Estatal y La Justicia, 2 BOLETIN INFORMATIVO, 4 (1983);
Marill, supra note 21, at 40. Under the Cuban Constitution, only the National Assembly has
the authority to declare a law unconstitutional. CUBA CONST1TUCI6N art. 73.
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prepared for ratification in 1975, the same year that SDPE was ap-
proved with the explicit recommendation that a state arbitration sys-
tem be established, 5 7 the drafters of the Constitution must have
assumed that the OAE was to be an administrative body created
under Article 17 and not governed by Article 121.' 58
Although many of its functions are clearly administrative, 59 it is
not readily apparent that all such economic administrative func-
tions-assuring the execution and fulfillment of contracts-can be
wholly divorced from the administration of justice. Among the pri-
mary objectives of the OAE dictated by statute is "to defend the social
interest and guarantee, at the same time, the interests and rights of the
socialist economic entities and other parties, in their contractual rela-
tions. '" 60 Certainly, the protection of rights under law is a fundamen-
tal function of courts of justice. Thus, to overcome the constitutional
conflict between the dictates of Article 121 and an interpretation of
Article 17 granting the state authority to organize juridical bodies to
enforce economic laws, the "rights" of enterprises in their contractual
relations must be considered of a different class than the "rights" of
citizens which are protected by the judicial system.
Enterprises are created by the state to administer "the socialist
property of the entire people." 1 6' They are subordinated to the Cen-
tral Administration of the state or to the corresponding People's As-
sembly. 62 The rights and obligations of enterprises adjudicated by
the OAE are those which are derived from the national plan: they are
the obligation to fulfill or work toward fulfillment of the plan and the
right to obtain performance and/or indemnification from those who
fail to fulfill contracts or otherwise interfere with the enterprise's op-
eration in fulfillment of its obligations under the plan. 163 The annual
157. See Informe Central I, supra note 10, at 115 (1976). The Main Report concludes:
In order to successfully implement the system the following factors are necessary
. . . to strengthen and develop the organs recently created and those which are nec-
essary to create as part of the institutions required to implement the [SDPE]: Com-
mittee of Prices, Committee of Technical Material Supply, Ministry of Finance,
Commissions of Arbitration.
Id. at 115-16.
158. See Marill, supra note 21, at 40.
159. For example, the issuance of regulations and resolution of pre-contractual problems
are administrative in nature.
160. Council of Ministers, Decree 23, art. 2(c) (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje Orginico),
reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MICA (1984).
161. CUBA CONSTITUCI6N art. 17.
162. Council of Ministers, Decree 42, art. 15 (1979) (Reglamento de la Empresa Estatal).
163. See supra notes 84-86, 93 and accompanying text.
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national plan is itself a law adopted by the National Assembly in De-
cember of each year. 64 Thus, the enterprises are established under
the constitutional authority granted in Article 17 and have no rights
beyond what the state requires to fulfill the plan. Moreover, the rights
and obligations of these enterprises, which are not fully autonomous,
are subject to modification by state planning bodies, 65 and resolution
of any inter-enterprise dispute by the OAE must serve the social inter-
est in the successful completion of the plan. Within this structure the
administrative functions of regulating and controlling contractual ob-
ligations to assure accountability of enterprises under the plan are
consistent with the authority provided in Article 17.
In contrast, the People's Tribunals adjudicate a wide range of
cases involving domestic relations, labor disputes and other civil ac-
tions as well as criminal prosecutions; 66 they are not narrowly con-
fined to contract and environmental disputes between state created
economic entities. For example, in addition, the cases heard by the
People's Tribunals primarily concern the interests and rights of indi-
viduals within the context of socialist law. 167 Moreover, Tribunals do
not take an active role in regulation or intervening "de oficio" as does
the OAE in order to further accountability and efficiency in the imple-
mentation of the national plan.1 68
The postulated coincidence of the rights of enterprises with the
interests of the state does not mean that these "rights" are not signifi-
cant and tangible to individual workers and managers.1 69 The effi-
cient functioning and profitability of the enterprise, as well as the
material rewards for its workers, depend on the enforcement of its
164. See, e.g., National Assembly, Law 31 (Del Plan Unico de Desarollo Economico-So-
cial del Estado Para el Afio 1981) (1981).
165. For example, an enterprise which manufactures shirts may have a quota of 1,000 one
year, but half as many the next year due to perceived changes in demand. The ability to
maximize profits may be limited by the quantities proposed in the plan. Enterprise manage-
ment and its workers would have some say in the quantities to be produced based on their
knowledge of the most efficient level of operation, but their view might not prevail in the face
of other societal considerations. Moreover, although enterprises can make additional goods
with excess materials not needed for "planned" production, the existence of excess materials is
itself controlled to some degree by the plan.
166. CUBA CONSTITUCION art. 123.
167. Id,
168. See Marill, supra note 21, at 40.
169. In a recent article on the Soviet arbitration system, Professor Hazard criticizes the
Soviet system for emphasizing accountability to the national plan over protection of the rights
of enterprises. Hazard, supra note 37. The criticism, however, overlooks the primary function
of state arbitration and misunderstands the nature of the "rights" accorded enterprises under
the system. See infra text accompanying notes 169-77.
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contractual rights. Thus, decentralization and the institution of mate-
rial incentives have created individual responsibility and a degree of
individualization of interests.
As stated at the time SDPE was introduced, the system depends
on strengthening socialist consciousness among workers and manag-
ers. 170 The absence of competition between enterprises and their mu-
tual participation in the development of the national economic plan is
expected to encourage a spirit of cooperation among enterprises.
171
Further, the national plan as well as specific production targets are
discussed by worker councils and management, and it is expected that
through participation in the planning process, managers and workers
will be committed to the plan, thus guaranteeing its fulfillment. 17
2
The significance of contracts and their completion is part of this dis-
cussion, and management has a continuing obligation to keep workers
informed of progress towards their fulfillment. 173 Thus, contracts
become both the legal and moral obligation of all and take on greater
significance than simply a documentation of agreement. "Contracts
between enterprises . . . are very important, not only in economic
terms, but in a political and moral sense as well, for our society."' 174
Socialist consciousness and cooperation among workers and
managers of state enterprises and the merging of the interests of state
enterprises with that of society are all ideals sought by revolution. 175
Material incentives were introduced based on the premise that work-
ers will be more productive and efficient if they have a personal, indi-
vidual interest in productivity. 76 Thus, despite the notion that
enterprises do not have rights in "profits" beyond what is established
in the plan, it is possible, if not likely, that workers and managers will
view their interest in profitability and the material rewards which it
provides them individually as separate from, although not necessarily
antithetical to, the social interest. Moreover, the process of negotiat-
170. INFORME CENTRAL, PRIMER CONGRESO DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA 113
(1976).
171. Besada Interview, supra note 66.
172. See also Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 219-22.
173. Besada Interview, supra note 66.
174. 2D CONG. PCC, supra note 12, at 389.
175. Arguing for the retention of central state control over economic planning and and
development, Edward Boorstein observed that "[i]t should be the aim of socialist organiza-
tional arrangements to make the actions of the enterprise coincide as much as possible with the
interests of society. But this is an ideal. In practice, there will always be deviations between
the two--often of great significance." E. BOORSTEIN, supra note 10, at 277.
176. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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ing terms which will maximize profitability in the self-interest of the
enterprise is likely to introduce some measure of adversariness in the
striking of the bargain.
Whether the perception of the interests of workers, enterprises
and society merge in practice is a major challenge to the system. The
stated policy is to implement moral incentives along with material
incentives, 177 but it is not yet demonstrated that a separation between
perceptions of self-interest and social interests will not occur. The
impressive involvement of Cuban workers 78 and managers in the
planning process, in addition to continuing efforts to increase both
groups' understanding of the new economic system through educa-
tional programs, are measures taken which may keep the gap from
becoming problematic.
The state arbitration system is essential to the promotion of a
collective consciousness and spirit of cooperation. The collective in-
terests are embodied in the duty of the OAE to simultaneously defend
the social interest and the rights of enterprises. Thus, adjudications
before the OAE are structured to be a cooperative pursuit of resolu-
tion for the common good.
Moreover, it is through state arbitration that accountability and
discipline is maintained and problems identified. Both independence
and consistency are essential to instill and maintain confidence in the
adjudicatory process. The OAE must be scrupulously impartial and
consistent with stated regulations. Although the OAE is appended to
the Council of Ministers, its exercise of jurisdiction over economic
disputes is independent of supervision by the Council of Ministers.
Decree 23, Article 14 states, "[t]he state arbitrators will be independ-
ent and impartial in their functions, owing obedience only to the law
in the exercise of same . . . . 179 Disregard for the law or facts by
the OAE, in pursuit of efficiency or favoritism, would undermine the
development of socialist consciousness and cooperation. Ineptitude
would destroy confidence. Thus, the OAE must continue to perfect
its expertise and the efficiency of its proceedings.
177. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
178. Zimbalist reports that the number of workers involved in the discussion of the annual
Plan has increased from 1.26 million in 1975 to 1.45 million in 1980, and that workers' sugges-
tions were used to amend the Plan's control figures in 42% of the enterprises in 1979 and in
59% for the 1980 Plan. Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 11.
179. Council of Ministers, Decree 23, art. 14 (1978) (Del Sistema de Arbitraje Orginico)
215, reprinted in LEGISLACI6N ECON6MlCA (1984).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
State arbitration has been in operation in Cuba barely five years.
It has been central to the implementation of the new system of eco-
nomic development and management introduced in 1975. As the sys-
tem begins to function throughout the economy, the primary role of
state arbitration will shift from implementation to regulation. Its ef-
fectiveness will depend not only on the expertise of the arbitrators and
their consultants, but on the level of commitment and understanding
of all personnel involved, including economists, managers and work-
ers. In addition to resolving disputes between the economic entities in
order to maintain discipline in the economy, the OAE must, through
its work, raise the level of understanding and commitment to the
system.
